Commission's expectations on eventual compliance explain its different behaviour when dealing with Rule of Law (RoL) crises in Hungary and Poland. Whilst the Commission activated the first stage of the procedure of article 7 against Poland in December 2017, it resisted to launch the same procedure against the Hungarian government despite mounting criticism and demands from both academics and EU institutions. The Commission considers that compliance depends, on last instance, on the cooperation of domestic authorities. Accordingly, it prefers to engage with them in dialogue and persuasion rather than activating enforcement mechanisms. If engagement strategies fail to obtain compliance, the Commission anticipates the consequence of activating article 7 enforcement: whether it can rely or not on Council support and the effects of not having it and it also anticipates negative consequences such as the future attitude of the affected member state vis-á-vis the EU.
Introduction
On 20 December 2017, the Commission activated the preventive stage of Article 7 for the first time. Illiberal changes in Hungary (since 2011) and Poland (since 2015) had caused alarm, prompting calls for the activation of the mechanism from EU institutions (EP; 2017a and 2017b) and scholars alike (Editors CMLR; 2016:601; 2 2017a ). While the Commission refrained from acting against Hungary, it did against the Polish government. The different outcomes in these two cases raises a crucial question: why has the Commission activated Article 7 against Poland? What explains the different treatment in relation to Hungary?
Scholars have speculated with possible explanations for the Commission's actions but they have not tested them systematically. This paper proposes a theoretically informed explanation, combining the Commission's preference for compliance through engagement with its anticipation of the consequences of its own decisions. Firstly, when deciding how to enforce European Union (EU) law, the Commission considers the possibility of obtaining effective compliance without coercion. Given the EU's reliance on the national authorities for compliance, the Commission always favours instruments that preserve its engagement with them.
Failing to achieve the engagement of the offending government, Commission decisions' on activating enforcement actions depend on the anticipation of their effects. On the one hand, the Commission anticipates the positions within the Council and the European Council in relation to procedures in article 7. Estimating that no Council majority or, even less so, European Council unanimity existed in support of its proposals, the Commission anticipated hypothetical negative effects of failing to obtain backing, such as reinforcing domestic offenders and/or erosion of its authority. On the other hand, the Commission also anticipates the possible negative domestic effects of a decision against an offending government: a sanctioning decision can backfire by provoking a 'rally-round-the-flag' effect. Whilst the later effect does not seem to play an important explanatory role, the combination of the preference for enforcement by engagement and the anticipation of effects because of lack of Council support hypotheses provides the most robust 3 explanation for Commission action. I first describe EU Commission actions in relation to the protection of the Rule of Law in its Member States and, the, I present the theoretical discussion of the various hypotheses. . I present next the evidence drawn from interviews with Commission officials and former Commissioners that support each of these hypotheses and then I discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.
Finally, the conclusion restates the paper's main theories. Recommendation that acknowledged that important issues remained unsolved while further concerns had emerged in the meantime. In July 2017, following the approval of four Polish laws reforming the judicial system, the Commission launched a first infringement procedure and issued a third Recommendation within the Framework which explicitly threatened to activate Article 7. Finally, on 20 December 2017, the Commission approved a fourth Recommendation and initiated the first stage of the article 7 procedure.
5
The huge scholarly criticism (Kelemen; Kochenov; Kochenov and Pech; 2017a&b; Scheppele; has targeted the limited enforcement actions (limited to infringement actions); the lack of Commission readiness to activate article 7 against Hungary and the slowness in Commission activation of the article against Poland. The Commission has officially justified its limited action appealing to the alternative enforcement via infringement action and the compliance obtained once the CJEU ruled on them and has officially argued that dialogue should happen before the Framework could evolve into the activation of article 7. The following section offers alternative theoretical explanations for Commission limited action and the activation of article 7.
Explaining institutional action and inaction
The predominant explanation for institutional inaction (Kelemen, 2016 Seldelmeier, 2014 Sargentino & Dimitrov; singles out EP group membership. Thus, members of the same EP group tolerate RoL backsliding if the offenders belong to the same group but will act against it if they belong to a different EP group (Van Hüllen and Börzel; Kelemen; . More generally, party politics would also explain the difference in the way the EU treats Hungary and Poland (Zalan; 2015) . Sedelmeier (2017) has convincingly tested the partisanship hypothesis using a sophisticated Qualitative Case Analysis for the EP where party politics and voting alignments are easily traceable in votes on resolutions condemning the specific policies of these governments. However, the effectiveness of the partisanship hypothesis for explaining Commission RoL actions remains untested. 6 The Commission's independent status implies that acting on the bases of political affiliation can be perceived as a violation of its treaty obligations (Wilms; 2017: 66) . We can thus assume prima facie that the Commission acts autonomously from national instructions and even ideological preferences. Moreover, Kassim et al (2013) have not found any evidence that ideology or more specifically party affiliation plays any role at all in explaining the Commission's activity and these findings confirm previous research (Wonka; . However, alternative evidence (Wille; 2013: 88-89) challenges this conclusion and substantiates the thesis that ideology (partisanship) could explain the Commission's actions to a certain extent, to the point that Egeberg (2014) concludes that the European Commission today is […] probably more of a political body than a typical technocracy. Moreover, the Spitzenkandidaten process has further increased the Commission's politicisation (Peterson; . Translating the argument to RoL protection, Kelemen (2016: 226) An alternative explanation for Commission action states that it anticipates the effects of its decisions. If the Commission anticipates undesired consequences from its enforcement actions, it may refrain from acting. This calculation involves three different effects. First, the Commission might act based on the probability that decision-making bodies, mainly the Council (and, by extension, the European Council) will uphold its initiative. Then, the Commission's calculation could also consider whether, even if it obtains Council support, the effects of the decision could either backfire, second, and/or not achieve actual compliance, third.
In relation to the anticipation of Council's support, Vitorino (2012) observed in general terms that the Commission is now forced to pay increasing heed to the guidelines and suggestions put forward by the European Council and Parliament and this intensifies in cases of co-legislation. However, Nugent and Rhinard (2016) found mixed evidence of the thesis that the Commission adopts a much more cautious approach because of the increase in intergovernmentalism during the crisis. Whilst these considerations apply generally to all EU decision-making, Article 7 constructs an even more pronounced decisional imbalance between the initiator (i.e. Commission) and the decision-maker (i.e. Council/European Council). The preventive procedure requires a 4/5ths qualified majority of the Council plus EP consent, whilst the corrective stage requires the European Council to act by unanimity. In a second step within the corrective stage, the Council may decide to adopt sanctions by qualified majority (although the 4/5ths requirement of the preventive stage disappears.
These high decisional thresholds create a genuine risk that the Council could overrule the Commission, in particular if unanimity is required (Kelemen; 2016: 230; Scheppele, 2016) . The political damage could be considerable since a Council refusal 8 would amount to an endorsement of the illiberal course of the offending government (Wilms; 2017: 68; Editors CMLR 2016) . Commission action would thus be expected if there were evidence that a significant and sufficient number of governments would be prepared to support its initiative. Alternatively, the Commission may refrain from action if it believes that the governments will not support its initiatives (Kochenov and Pech; : 1066 . As Pech and Scheppele (2017b) The Commission may also decide calculating that the decision may either backfire or may not achieve compliance. Backfiring means that sanctions may increase domestic support for the offending government (the rally-round-the-flag effect). The literature on sanctions has identified that this rally-round-the-flag effect occurs whenever a threat of 9 sanctions arouses a nationalist response within the target government or population, undermining the effectiveness of the threat (Galtung, 1967) . Research has shown that under certain conditions, sanctions trigger a rally-round-the-flag effect and support for authoritarian leaders (Lindsay, 1986; Grauvogel and von Soest; Observers have warned that rally-round-the-flag effects could emerge if the EU activates Article 7 (Schlipphak and Treib; Editors CMLR; 2016: 602) increasing, as a consequence, the support for those domestic actors that EU intervention is supposed to weaken (Schlipphak and Treib; . Commission-led decisions can have a galvanising effect within the 'indicted' state and as a corollary, further alienate this Member State's government and population from the European Union and its institutions (Bieber and Maiani; Wilms; 2017: 68) .
Opinions that the 1999 sanctions against Austria produced these kinds of unintended and undesired consequences (Ahtisaari et al; 2000; Merlingen et al; Oreja; 2011; Wilms; 2017: 70) Finally, the literature on compliance with EU norms (Börzel; Tallberg; 2002; 2010; Conant; 2012; Falkner; The Commission almost always attempts to resolve breaches of compliance through a structured dialogue with the Member State in question (Batory: 2016: 688) and uses enforcement mechanisms very carefully. Blauberger andKelemen (2017) To validate the hypotheses drawn from theory above, I have established observable implications for each. Observable implications are the facts and/or data to be found if a hypothesis were borne out. To confirm a hypothesis, the empirical evidence must match the expectations of its observable implications. Table 1 These limits set the contours of Commission action modelled on two pillars. First, the Commission prefers to tackle any RoL issues as specific breaches of EU law and thus to treat them by means of infringement procedures. This preference emerged very strongly in the interviews. The interviewees portrayed these domestic breaches firstly and foremost in relation to EU competences. In these cases, they would then feel legitimised and emboldened to initiate Commission action via infringement procedures (Reding; 3, 4, 6; C 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 15; A 1, 51; F 10; Z; 10, 11; Almunia 1; Tavares 4, 6, 26) Our aim is to solve these issues; our aim is not to accuse, to go into a polemic. Our aim is to solve the issues in a rational way based on our legal obligations (Timmermans; 2016a). 
Discussion
The table below summarises the explanatory value that the findings grant to each hypothesis. Table 2 above here Evidence shows that the Commission anticipated the effects of its actions when deciding on the enforcement of RoL. The causal mechanism begins with the Commission's preference for compliance through instruments that can actively engage offending governments rather than those which could lead to severe sanctions (i.e. second stage of Article 7). This is because, apart from a genuine belief in its role as 'accompanying' national governments in seeking compliance, the Commission is well aware that lacking real coercion mechanisms, compliance depends on the will of national authorities. A preference for engagement mechanisms also explains why the Commission privileges 
Conclusion
The story behind Commission activation of Article 7 against the Polish government shows its preference for engagement strategies and its reluctance to use enforcement mechanisms. This story also shows the limits to the EU enforcement system: lacking last instance coercion, the Commission relies mainly on domestic cooperation and this can encourage governments to comply only symbolically or rhetorically (Bátory; 2016). Sanctions may play a role to obtain compliance in specific cases but its capacity to force systemic change remains untested. In any case, whether applying a more engaging or enforcing attitude, results seem fairly similar in both cases with a steady erosion of the separation of powers in favour of an increase of the powers of the executive. Whilst activation of article 7 against the Polish authorities shows some signs of engagement previously absent, whether it would suffice to reverse course remains questionable. 
